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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES V. CHACON: UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, A FORCIBLE SEX OFFENSE
CONSTITUTES A CRIME OF VIOLENCE EVEN IN THE
ABSENCE OF THE USE, ATTEMPTED USE, OR
THREATENED USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE.
By: Chris Tully
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, as
an issue of first impression, that a forcible sex offense, which occurred
without consent and in the absence of the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force, constitutes a crime of violence.
United States v. Chacon, 533 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2008). Specifically,
the court opined that a forcible sex offense does not require physical
force as an element and thus can be categorized as a crime of violence
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 252.
On December 12, 2002, a Maryland state court convicted Jesus
Chacon ("Chacon"), an illegal alien, of second-degree rape under the
Maryland Code. The criminal information did not specify the conduct
underlying the charge, and Chacon plead guilty to the offense.
Therefore, it was unclear which of the three subsections of the statute
applied in Chacon's conviction. Subsequently, he was deported to
Honduras. In November 2006, Chacon illegally reentered the United
States, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested
him for using a false permanent resident card.
On December 28, 2006, a federal grand jury for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Chacon for
offenses relating to his illegal reentry and use of a false resident card.
Chacon plead guilty to both offenses. The Sentencing Committee
calculated the Presentence Report for these federal crimes by
classifying Chacon's previous rape conviction in Maryland as a "crime
of violence" to increase the base offense level by sixteen. Based on
this increase, the court sentenced Chacon to a forty-one month prison
term. Chacon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
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Section 2Ll.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides
that a prior "crime of violence" can increase the sentence for an illegal
reentry by sixteen levels. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253 (citing USSG §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)). Under this section, "crime of violence" includes
ten different felonies and misdemeanors, including: forcible sex
offenses, statutory rape, or any state law that has the element of the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Chacon, 533
F.3d at 254 (citing USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii)). Chacon argued
that the district court erred because his second-degree rape conviction
was improperly considered a "crime of violence" in the Presentence
Report. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253.
In Maryland, second-degree rape convictions arise from three
separate scenarios. Id. at 255. The crime may occur when a person
engages in vaginal intercourse with another: (1) by force or threat of
force against the will and without the consent of the other person; or
(2) who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should
reasonably know of the other person's condition; or (3) who is under
fourteen years of age and the person performing the act is at least four
years older. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253 (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27 §
463).

Since it was unclear which subsection of the rape statute Chacon
violated, the Court of Appeals analyzed the Maryland second-degree
rape statute in its entirety. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253. The court found
that the first subsection of the rape statute constituted a "crime of
violence" under the guidelines because it contained the physical
element language, "by force or threat of force," which is the wording
used in Section 2L1.2's definition of a "crime of violence." Chacon,
533 F.3d at 254 (citing USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(b)(iii)). The court
also explained that the third subsection describes the rape of a minor,
which is specifically listed in Section 2L1.2's definition of a "crime of
violence." Chacon, 533 F.3d at 254 (citing USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.
1(b)(iii)). Therefore, these two subsections are "crimes of violence"
under the sentencing guidelines. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 254.
The second subsection of the rape statute deals with "vaginal
intercourse with a person who is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless and, the person performing the act
knows or should reasonably know of the other person's condition." Id.
at 255 (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27 § 463). There is no language in
this subsection providing that the use, attempted use, or threatened use
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of force is a necessary element of the offense. Chacon, 533 F.3d at
255. As an issue of first impression, the court sought to determine if
this form of rape should be considered a "forcible sex offense" based
on the definition listed in the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 255.
The Fourth Circuit had to determine the ordinary meaning of
"forcible" because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not provide a
definition. Id. at 257. The court explained that "forcible" generally
means "effected by force or threat of force against opposition."
Chacon, 533 F.3d at 257 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th
ed. 2004)). In addition, the court defined the term "force" as "power,
violence or pressure directed against a person or thing." Chacon, 533
F.3d at 257 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004)).
The court continued by stating that "power" is "dominance, control or
influence." Chacon, 533 F.3d at 257 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004)). Applying these definitions, the court
concluded that physical force is not necessary for an action to be
"forcible;" therefore, the second subsection of Maryland's rape statute
would be a "forcible act" without having an element of physical force.
Chacon, 533 F.3d at 257.
The court next scrutinized the intention of the Sentencing
Commission.ld at 258. The Commission used the word "forcible" to
modify "sex offenses," instead of the less ambiguous term "physical."
Id. The court determined that the Commission deliberately chose the
word "forcible" to show that "physical" was not a required element of
"forcible sex offenses." Id. The fact that there are other sections of the
guidelines where the Commission specifically chose to use the word
"physical" supports this conclusion. Id. Additionally, the Commission
included in its list of "crimes of violence" statutory rape and sexual
abuse of a minor, which have no "physical" force components. Id.
This shows that physical force is not necessary to make rape a "crime
of violence." Chacon, 533 F.3d at 258.
The court examined how other circuits have ruled on this issue. Id.
at 256-57. The court acknowledged that both the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have ruled that a "forcible sex offense" requires some
physical component, and nonconsensual sex crimes should not be
considered "forcible." Id. at 256. However, the court also cited to the
Tenth and Third Circuits, which held that nonconsensual sex
constitutes a "forcible sex offense," despite lacking any actual physical
force. Id at 256-57. The court clarified that the latter approach is
more appropriate as the Third Circuit ruling deals with the latest
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version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and is factually
analogous to the instant case. Id. at 257. Thus, the court concluded
that physical force is not a requirement for a "forcible act" under
sentencing guidelines, and all subsections of Maryland's rape statute
are within the definition of "crimes of violence." Id. at 257.
The Chacon decision is valuable to Maryland practitioners. First,
with other circuits split on this issue, the court's opinion may now
provide greater clarity in this area. Second, the holding interprets
Maryland's second-degree rape statute as a "crime of violence" for the
purpose of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, allowing prior seconddegree rape convictions in Maryland to justify harsher sentences.
Finally, crimes which are "forcible offenses" do not need to have
"physical force" as an element under sentencing guidelines.
Therefore, juries now have the ability to impose harsher sentences
without having to find that a defendant committed an act of physical
force.

